Is the Consumer Welfare Obsolete? A European Union Competition Law and Competition Perspective
Abstract
In 2005, the European Commission advocated for a more economic approach to enforcing competition laws. The sole criterion for assessing the lawfulness of a market practice should be the appraisal of its net effect on consumer welfare. The Court of Justice was reluctant to adopt such an approach until its 2017 Intel Judgment. Its endorsement—which is debatable insofar as the judgment may give rise to different interpretations—may appear paradoxical in that it is concomitant with a sharp challenge to the consumer welfare criterion in the United States. The purpose of this article is to retrace the history of this criterion, particularly its adoption in the context of EU competition law. We aim to show that the criticisms of the effects-based approach can be addressed not by moving away from the consumer welfare criterion but by integrating it into a broader perspective that also takes into account the protection of the competition process itself.
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References
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