South-South Cooperation, Brazil and Cape Verde: Implementation Assessment (1995–2016)

Resumen

The Cardoso, Lula, and Rousseff governments established South-South Cooperation (SSC) as a cornerstone of Brazil’s international insertion, despite their distinct political-strategic biases. Based on foreign policy goals, high-level National Defense documents, and cooperation agreements, Brazil sought to project leadership and induce security in the South Atlantic. The choice of Cape Verde is justified by its strategic location in the Gulf of Guinea — an area rich in resources but vulnerable to “new threats,” such as piracy and transnational crime. The research hypothesis posits that this public intervention faced significant implementation gaps, depending on internal and external circumstances. The primary objective of this paper is to evaluate the implementation of Brazil-Cape Verde SSC (1995–2016) using Vedung’s evaluation framework, comprising four pillars: intervention theory, the goal attainment model, stakeholder mapping, and the eight problems approach. Fundamentally, the analysis transcends government rhetoric by employing a triangulation of data, including diplomatic telegrams, defense documents, and interviews with military personnel. By treating the historical mapping of the three administrations as foundational empirical evidence, the study identifies the structural gaps that hindered the full achievement of Brazil’s strategic objectives in the South Atlantic.